Or, would it be there is some shared property(-ies) between the two?
The transaction not to proceed with the route that posits merely aˆ?what isaˆ? was more difficult of the fragmentary document there is some sort of near partnership between thinking (or once you understand) and being (what is out there, or can exists, or always is out there): aˆ?…for thinking being are the same thing,aˆ? or aˆ?…for a similar thing is for thought as it is for beingaˆ? (C 4/DK 3). Does Parmenides actually indicate to produce an identity state involving the two-that reasoning really is numerically one therefore the same as are, and vice-versa? Are Parmenides making the very problematic declare that whatever can be believed, prevails (contrast Gorgias aˆ?On Nature, or What-is-Notaˆ?)? Or, more charitably, merely that whatever really does exists can in principle end up being considered without contradiction, https://datingranking.net/arkansas/ and therefore are easy to understand by reason-unlike aˆ?nothingnessaˆ?? Probably both? Mostly, Parmenides might understood here as expecting Russellian concerns with vocabulary and how definition and guide must be coextensive with, and even preceded by, ontology (Owen 1960).
Nevertheless, from these epistemic considerations, the goddess’ deductive arguments in C/DK 8 should follow with certainty from deductive, a priori reasoning. By studiously steering clear of thinking at all which entails contemplating aˆ?what-is-not,aˆ? via reductio, the topic of the truth is determined become: genuinely eternal-ungenerated and imperishable (8.5-21), a continuous full (8.21-25), unmoved and special (8.21-33), great and consistent (8.42-49). For example, since coming-to-be requires positing aˆ?not-beingaˆ? prior to now, and mutatis mutandis for perishing, and because aˆ?not-beingaˆ?